• Super Admin
• 08 Mar, 2026

While so much attention is focused on Section 60(3) of the Electoral Act, 2026, as amended, which deals with what happens immediately after votes have been cast, counted, and winners announced at the polling unit by the presiding officer, not many have taken the time to interrogate Section 77, which addresses events that must take place even before Election Day proper. Now, make no mistake about it: the 2027 election will be conducted largely manually. Election materials will be distributed manually. The casting of votes will be done manually. The recording of results in Form EC8A at the polling units will be done manually. The signing of Form EC8A by the presiding officer and party agents will also be done manually. Even the announcement of results at the polling unit will be done manually. The only stage in the entire process where the law provides the option of either manual or electronic procedure is in the transmission of results that have already been manually recorded. Here, Section 60 becomes relevant. Where electronic transmission fails due to communication or network problems, the law provides that the manually completed Form EC8A becomes the primary document for the collation and declaration of results. This means the law recognises both electronic transmission, and manual result forms as the legal fallback. While Nigerians have focused so intensely on electronic transmission, as though the entire electoral process depends solely on it, the more consequential reform embedded in Section 77 has largely passed unnoticed and unexamined. A similar situation occurred during the 2022 amendment to the Electoral Act. At the time, public debate was dominated by the provision dealing with the timeline for the resignation of political appointees seeking elective office. In the process, many failed to notice another critical amendment: the law had removed statutory delegates from participating in party primaries. Under that amendment, only the three-man ad hoc delegates elected from each ward were legally recognised to vote at party primaries. This change had far-reaching consequences for aspirants across the political spectrum -- except, of course, for those who controlled the process of appointing or influencing the selection of those three-man delegates. In the current 2026 amendment, the real change is not in Section 60. The real reform took place in Section 77. Very soon, politicians with ambitions for 2027 will come to realise this. Section 77 deals with political party membership and the legal requirement that a digital copy of a party's membership register must be submitted to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) at least 21 days before party primaries. The section requires every registered political party to maintain both physical and digital registers of its members. These registers must contain verifiable details, including members' names, gender, date of birth, address, state, local government area, ward, polling unit, photograph, and National Identification Number (NIN). In essence, the section mandates political parties to maintain a comprehensive digital register of their members and submit such a register to INEC not later than 21 days before conducting their primaries, congresses, or conventions. At first glance, this requirement may appear purely administrative. But beneath the surface lies a structural reform capable of addressing one of the most corrosive habits in Nigeria's political culture, the notorious practice of political decampment. For decades, Nigerian politics has witnessed a recurring trend where aspirants who fail to secure nominations within their parties suddenly decamp to other parties, sometimes within days, to secure fresh tickets and re-enter the electoral contest. Section 77 appears designed to place a decisive check on this culture of opportunistic defection. This could be the closing of the "backdoor" route, as the law, most significantly, mandates that the digital membership register must be submitted to INEC not later than 21 days before party primaries. Once submitted, that register becomes the official membership record of the party for the purpose of the primaries. In other words, political parties are not permitted to rely on any other register outside the one already submitted to the electoral commission in conducting their activities, including primaries and candidate nominations. The implication is straightforward: only individuals whose names appear in that submitted register are eligible to participate in the party's primaries, either as voters or aspirants. A typical pattern has emerged over successive election cycles where an aspirant contests the primary in Party A and loses. Within hours or days, the same aspirant defects to Party B or Party C and suddenly emerges as the candidate of that party. This phenomenon has not only weakened party discipline but has also reduced political parties to mere temporary vehicles for electoral ambition. Section 77 appears to have introduced a permanent structural barrier against this pattern. Once all political parties have submitted their membership registers to INEC 21 days before primaries, the membership composition of each party becomes fixed for that electoral cycle. And case closed. Anyone who is not already captured in a party's digital register cannot suddenly emerge as a member eligible to contest that party's primary. In practical terms, an aspirant who loses the nomination in Party A cannot simply move to Party B afterward unless his or her name was already part of Party B's register submitted to INEC. Since it is legally impossible to belong to two political parties at the same time, this provision may significantly cure, and potentially end, the culture of political decampment for ticket acquisition. Once a candidate loses the nomination of his party, his aspiration for that electoral cycle effectively ends until the next election. That is the implication. However, some opinions argue that Section 77 and its restrictions may infringe on citizens' constitutional right to freedom of association, guaranteed under Section 40 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). This argument, however, tends to overlook the fact that the Constitution itself provides the legal foundation for regulating political parties, which is precisely why the Electoral Act exists. Section 228 of the Constitution expressly empowers the National Assembly to enact laws governing the structure, organization, and operation of political parties. Similarly, Section 221 of the Constitution provides that only political parties can sponsor candidates for elections. Consequently, participation in elections is not purely an individual right; it is mediated through political parties operating within a legally regulated framework. Section 77 of the Electoral Act, as amended, therefore does not prohibit anyone from joining any political party. Rather, it regulates the conditions under which individuals may participate in political activities, including party nomination processes. In essence, Section 77 does not abolish freedom of association; it simply introduces order, discipline, and predictability into electoral participation. From all indications, it's time to instill discipline in party politics. There is no gainsaying the fact that Nigeria's political system urgently needs greater party discipline. For too long, political loyalty in Nigeria has been fluid and transactional. Many politicians treat political parties as disposable platforms rather than enduring institutions. By tying eligibility for primaries to a pre-submitted membership register, the law encourages several important behavioural changes. First, politicians will now have to identify and commit to their political platforms much earlier in the electoral cycle. Second, aspirants will be compelled to build genuine support structures within their parties rather than relying on post-primary defections. Third, political parties themselves will be forced to maintain credible and transparent membership records, something that has historically been absent in Nigeria's party administration. Above all, Section 77 sends a clear message: party membership must precede political ambition. Finally, a cure for the notorious habit of politicians decamping from one party to another, after losing nomination, may be here. Party loyalty may at last become sacrosanct. The instinctive habit of politicians jumping from one party to another whenever personal ambitions collide with party decisions must gradually give way to political discipline. This culture, before now, has produced several consequences. Weak ideological identity among parties. Constant political instability. Erosion of internal party democracy. The perception that political parties are merely electoral vehicles Section 77 may not eliminate defections entirely, but it significantly raises the cost of opportunistic defection. Politicians will still retain the right to change parties. However, such decisions must now occur long before the primary season, not as a reaction to losing a nomination contest. In that sense, the law introduces strategic foresight into Nigerian politics, replacing impulsive political migration with deliberate political alignment. Like many reforms in Nigeria, the success of Section 77 will depend largely on implementation. INEC must shoulder the burden of enforcement. INEC now carries the responsibility of maintaining and verifying the digital membership registers submitted by political parties. The Commission must also ensure that parties do not manipulate or alter those registers after submission. Equally important will be the role of the judiciary. When disputes inevitably arise, the courts will determine whether the spirit and intent of the law are upheld. Without firm enforcement, the provision could easily become another well-intentioned rule undermined by political expediency. For the first time in a long while, the law seeks to align political ambition with party loyalty and institutional order. Whether the reform succeeds will depend on how political actors and the electoral umpire respond. Those accustomed to navigating the electoral system through opportunistic defections may find the terrain significantly altered. But if the provision is faithfully enforced, Nigeria may finally begin to move away from the culture of political opportunism toward a more structured and responsible democratic practice. Source: https://theeagleonline.com.ng/2027-how-section-77-could-frustrate-aspirants-as-post-primary-defection-window-closes-by-enyinnaya-appolos/