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Kyle F. McCarter previously served in the U.S. Army Southern Europe Task Force Africa (SETAF) in Botswana, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. He presently serves in the U.S. Army Pacific's (USARPAC) Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center (JPMRC). He has published multiple articles on various national security topics. Divergent Options' content does not contain information of an official nature, nor does the content represent the official position of any government, any organization, or any group. National Security Situation: Islamic militancy in the Sahel region, specifically in the state of Mali, causes destabilizing effects on the entire West African region. Article Point of View: The article is written from the point of view of a Joint Planner on the U.S. Africa Command (USAFRICOM) staff concerning the ongoing regional conflicts in the Sahel and the established Alliance of Sahel States (AES). Background: In response to the ongoing conflicts in the region, the military regimes of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger signed a treaty establishing the AES on September 16, 2023 [1]. The roots of the current struggle for power in the region originate from various sources: ancient rivalries; European colonial influences; environmental challenges; violent extremist groups; and the ever-growing impact of global markets. Historic rivalries between nomadic and farmer cultures. Specifically in Mali, three groups vie for resources: the Tuareg, a nomadic pastoralist people in the north; the Fulani, nomadic herdsmen in the central Sahel; and the sedentary farmers in the south [2]. Differences in views on power dynamics combined with competition over limited resources drive conflict in regions where these groups overlap. Superficial colonial borders. The European colonial influx into Western Africa in the late 1800s by France, Britain, Portugal, and Germany yielded a fragmented and broken tribal hierarchy [3]. A wave of independence movements in the 1950s and 1960s ushered in new African-led states with a mix of tribal, ethnic, and linguistic backgrounds. In many instances, these differences contributed toward a tumultuous transition to self-rule. Environmental challenges. Global climate change, deforestation, and desertification have all contributed to increased likelihood for conflict [4]. Specifically, decreased grazing land and access to water have increased tensions between nomadic and sedentary groups [5]. Currently, the Sahel Region exists as a transborder region where these groups overlap and compete. Global Markets. The evolution of global digital markets connected Africa to cheap products from China and second-hand markets with concomitant effects on a variety of jobs [6]. Access to global markets also exposed Western Africa to the exploitation of natural resources in a continuation of Western colonial system practices [7]. Additionally, the surge of state-sponsored trafficking operations further eroded public support in governments and fueled insurgencies [8]. Significance: By 2026, the conditions precipitating the AES' formation solidified into a new strategic reality. Violent extremist organizations (VEOs) now operate with significant freedom of movement within the AES zone, weakening the rule of law and exacerbating food scarcity. The AES formally withdrew from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and created a distinct, adversarial political-economic block [9]. Furthermore, the overt presence of Russia's "Africa Corps," a successor to the Wagner Group and the primary external security partner for AES juntas, displaced remaining French and U.S. influence [10]. The forced withdrawal of most Western counter-terrorism forces from the region severely degraded USAFRICOM's intelligence and operational capabilities [11]. The AES now exists as a Russian-backed bloc openly defiant of ECOWAS, the African Union (AU), and any Western intervention. Option #1: External Military Action (Counterfactual Analysis). Complete dismantling of AES-based VEOs via a United Nations Security Council resolution for the use of force and the establishment of a robust UN military formation. Overwhelming military power to defeat VEOs from their stronghold in northern Mali, to include operations into Algeria, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, and Burkina Faso. Risk: As of 2026, this option is politically impossible. Russia would almost certainly veto this resolution at the UN Security Council to protect its strategic partners in the AES. Even if this option was politically feasible, it presents a high likelihood of conflict expansion, a significant risk to UN forces, and a drain on U.S. military resources already strained by global commitments. Gain: (Hypothetical) Restoration of internationally recognized governments in the Sahel region, re-entry of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger into ECOWAS, and validation of the UN's role in maintaining global peace and enforcing international law. Option #2: African Union-Led Diplomatic Initiative. The AU, backed by Western partners, proposes a comprehensive peace and economic package. A framework for a two-state solution in Mali (Republic of Mali and a semi-autonomous northern state) serves as this option's focal point. This offer is tied to massive debt relief and economic incentives, conditional on the AES bloc re-engaging with ECOWAS and curtailing VEO activity. Risk: The AES is highly likely to reject any proposal seen as originating from the AU or the West. This option would directly compete with entrenched Russian political and military influence, which benefits from the region's instability and isolation. This option incurs a high risk that AES juntas view Russian patronage as more beneficial to their regime security than any economic support offered by the West. Gain: If successful, this option could restore peace, increase legitimate trade, and provide a Western-aligned alternative to the AES's complete dependency on Russia, potentially fracturing the bloc from within. It would also re-legitimize the AU and ECOWAS. Option #3: Containment and Strategic Engagement. The U.S. and its allies shift from direct action within the AES to a long-term strategy of containing the instability. This option involves robustly funding and training the security forces of coastal Gulf of Guinea states (Ghana, Togo, Benin, Ivory Coast) to prevent VEO expansion southward. Concurrently, the U.S. maintains open, if limited, diplomatic channels with the AES juntas, offering an "off-ramp" from total Russian dependency through conditional humanitarian aid and long-term commercial ties. Risk: This is a slow, largely passive strategy that cedes the initiative to the AES and Russia in the short term. It does not solve the immediate VEO problem within the Sahel and risks being perceived as American weakness or disengagement. There is no guarantee that the juntas will fully pivot away from Russia. Gain: This pragmatic and cost-effective option could at least fulfill minimal U.S. policy objectives for the region. It avoids a direct or proxy conflict with a Russian-backed bloc, protects key U.S. partners in coastal West Africa, and maintains a long-term strategic posture to counter Russian influence, all while working within current geopolitical constraints. [1] Klomegah, Kester Kenn (2024). The Alliance of Sahel States: Implications, Challenges, and Prospects in West Africa. Modern Diplomacy, All Views, All Voices. Retrieved February 10, 2026. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/09/17/the-alliance-of-sahel-states-implications-challenges-and-prospects-in-west-africa/ [2] Bociaga, Robert (2023). How the Sahel's Tribal Divisions Undermine Security in Conflict-Prone African Region - Analysis. Eurasia Review News and Analysis. Retrieved February 10, 2026. https://www.eurasiareview.com/29082023-how-the-sahels-tribal-divisions-undermine-security-in-conflict-prone-african-region-analysis/ [3] Fage, John D. (2026). Colonization of Western Africa. Britannica. Retrieved February 10, 2026. https://www.britannica.com/place/western-Africa/Colonization [4] Tesfaye, Beza (2022). Climate Change and Conflict in the Sahel. Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved February 22, 2026. https://www.cfr.org/reports/climate-change-and-conflict-sahel [5] No Author (2021). The Sahel Faces 3 Issues: Climate, Conflict & Overpopulation. Vision of Humanity. Retrieved February 22, 2026. https://www.visionofhumanity.org/challenges-facing-the-sahel-climate-conflict-and-overpopulation/ [6] Cheng, Evelyn and Victoria Yeo (2025). Chinese consumer brands flood into Africa as old investment model fades and exports jump 28%. CNBC, China Markets. Retrieved February 22, 2026. https://www.cnbc.com/2025/11/24/china-africa-expansion-shifts-infrastructure-resource-mining-consumer-goods-investment.html?msockid=34a9d184859764171a71c68c84b56505 [7] No Author (2025). From Liberation to Exploitation: Russia's Resource Deals in Africa. Robert Lansing Institute for Global Threats and Democracies Studies. Retrieved February 22, 2026. https://lansinginstitute.org/2025/04/29/from-liberation-to-exploitation-russias-resource-deals-in-africa/ [8] No Author (2025). The Economy of Instability: How Trafficking Networks Fuel Conflict in the Sahel. African Security Analysis. Retrieved February 22, 2026. https://www.africansecurityanalysis.org/reports/the-economy-of-instability-how-trafficking-networks-fuel-conflict-in-the-sahel [9] Klomegah, Kester Kenn (2024). The Alliance of Sahel States: Implications, Challenges, and Prospects in West Africa. Modern Diplomacy, All Views, All Voices. Retrieved February 10, 2026. https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/09/17/the-alliance-of-sahel-states-implications-challenges-and-prospects-in-west-africa/ [10] Fischer, Nikolas (2026). US, Russia vie for Influence in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Microsoft Network News. Retrieved February 10, 2026. https://www.msn.com/en-xl/politics/international-relations/us-recalibrates-strategy-in-africa-s-sahel-region/ar-AA1VEXyv?ocid=BingNewsVerp [11] Kurt, Nina (2024). Security and Economic Implications of the Exit of the AES Countries from ECOWAS. West Africa Network for Peacebuilding. Retrieved February 10, 2026. https://wanep.org/wanep/security-and-economic-implications-of-the-exit-of-the-aes-countries-from-ecowas/ Source: https://divergentoptions.org/2026/03/07/options-to-counter-islamic-militancy-in-the-sahel-region/